Depression is often characterized by attentional biases toward negative items and away from positive items, which likely affects reward and punishment processing. Recent work has reported that training attention away from negative stimuli reduced this bias and reduced depressive symptoms. However, the effect of attention training on subsequent learning has yet to be explored. In the present study, participants were required to learn to maximize reward during decision making. Undergraduates with elevated self-reported depressive symptoms received attention training toward positive stimuli prior to performing the decision-making task (n = 20; active training). The active-training group was compared to two other groups: undergraduates with elevated self-reported depressive symptoms who received placebo training (n = 22; placebo training) and a control group with low levels of depressive symptoms (n = 33; nondepressive control). The placebotraining depressive group performed worse and switched between options more than did the nondepressive controls on the reward maximization task. However, depressives that received active training performed as well as the nondepressive controls. Computational modeling indicated that the placebotrained group learned more from negative than from positive prediction errors, leading to more frequent switching. The nondepressive control and active-training depressive groups showed similar learning from positive and negative prediction errors, leading to less-frequent switching and better performance. Our results indicate that individuals with elevated depressive symptoms are impaired at reward maximization, but that the deficit can be improved with attention training toward positive stimuli.
attentional bias in depression (Mogg & Bradley, 2005) . In addition, depression is also associated with the absence of a positive attentional bias. That is, nondepressed individuals typically have an attentional bias toward positive stimuli relative to neutral stimuli, which is often lacking among depressives (Ellis, Beevers, & Wells, 2011; Gotlib & Krasnoperova, 1998; Sears, Thomas, LeHuquet, & Johnson, 2010) . Thus, depression involves biased attention toward negative stimuli and the absence of a bias toward positive stimuli.
Depression is also associated with decreased sensitivity to reward (i.e., Henriques, Glowacki, & Davidson, 1994; Pizzagalli et al., 2009 ) and decision-making deficits (Beevers et al., 2013; Maddox, Gorlick, Worthy, & Beevers, 2012; Pizzagalli, Iosifescu, Hallett, Ratner, & Fava, 2008) . We hypothesized that attentional biases and decision-making deficits are not independent and that depressives' deficits in decision making might be a consequence of an attentional bias toward negative stimuli (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010) . That is, depressives' hypersensitivity to punishment and biased attention toward negative stimuli may cause them to respond suboptimally in decision-making tasks (Eshel & Roiser, 2010) . Thus, if depressives' attentional bias can be alleviated, decision making should also improve. The goal of the present study was to test this possibility by experimentally manipulating attention bias toward positive items before a decision-making task. We predicted that training would attenuate deficits in reward-based decision making that have been observed in individuals with elevated depressive symptoms.
Reward processing and decision-making deficits in depressives
As we noted above, depression is associated with decreased sensitivity to rewarding stimuli (Berenbaum & Oltmanns, 1992; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Henriques & Davidson, 2000; Henriques et al., 1994) . Individuals with elevated depressive symptoms exhibit attenuated behavioral responsiveness to monetary gains (Henriques & Davidson, 2000) , but hypersensitivity to negative feedback and punishment (Eshel & Roiser, 2010) . In addition, those with depression show significantly weaker functional responses to monetary rewards in the bilateral caudate and left nucleus accumbens, areas of the brain involved in immediate feedback processing, but these differences were not seen in the neutral or punishment conditions (Pizzagalli et al., 2009) .
Depressives' deficits in reward processing may contribute to deficits in decision-making tasks. In two recent studies, we found that individuals with elevated depressive symptoms showed impaired decision making when asked to maximize gains, but showed enhanced decision making when asked to minimize losses (Beevers et al., 2013; Maddox et al., 2012) .
Other studies have shown similar results. For example, Kunisato et al. (2012) found that depressives have rewardbased decision-making deficits and respond with more variable action selection than do nondepressed participants. Using a probabilistic reward task, Pizzagalli et al. (2008) found that depressives were responsive to the delivery of single rewards but were impaired at integrating reinforcement history over time.
We propose that the observed decision-making deficits are due to depressives' negative attentional biases, which could undermine learning from rewards. Decision making is a complex process, but one critical aspect of decision making, in healthy individuals and clinical populations alike, is reward-based learning (i.e., Ridderinkhof & van den Wildenberg, 2004) . One necessary aspect of reward-based learning is the acquisition of knowledge, implicit or explicit, about the relationships between stimuli and actions (Berridge & Robinson, 2003) . Thus, individuals must learn from available rewards and use this information to make decisions.
We hypothesized that because depressed individuals pay more attention to negative than to positive stimuli, they will learn more from negative than from positive information. Nondepressed individuals, in contrast, should show the opposite pattern. This explanation is consistent with our prior work, in which we found enhanced punishment processing and reduced reward processing in individuals with elevated depressive symptoms (Beevers et al., 2013; Maddox et al., 2012) . It follows that attenuating these individuals' negative attentional bias should, in turn, enhance reward-based decision-making performance. We tested this by manipulating attention to positive stimuli.
Attention training
Recent research suggests that biases in attention toward emotion stimuli is malleable and can be altered with targeted training. A seminal study by MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, and Holker (2002) showed that attention training could create a negative bias in healthy individuals who did not initially possess such a bias and that such training could lead to a greater negative response to a laboratory stressor. Similarly, healthy individuals trained to direct attention toward positive stimuli spent significantly less time viewing negative images during a subsequent visual stress task, thus demonstrating a learned aversion to negative stimuli (Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2008) .
This work with healthy individuals suggests that attention training can causally mediate emotional vulnerability and that modifying selective information processing may have potential therapeutic value (Hakamata et al., 2010; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011) . Building upon this work, Wells and Beevers (2010) used a variant of the dot-probe task (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986) to train depressed individuals to shift attention away from negative images. During training, participants viewed negative and neutral image pairs followed by a dot probe. In the active-training condition, neutral images predicted the probe location 85 % of the time, whereas in the placebo-training control condition, neither image type (neutral or negative) predicted the probe location. Depressed individuals in the active-attention-training condition showed a reduced bias toward negative items and reported significant reductions in depressive symptoms two weeks posttraining, as compared to control participants (see also Baert, De Raedt, Schacht, & Koster, 2010) 
Present research
In the present research, we used attention training to direct the attention of individuals with elevated depressive symptoms toward positive information in order to improve reward-based decision making. During training, participants viewed positive and neutral word pairs followed by a dot probe. In the activeattention-training condition, positive words predicted the probe location 85 % of the time, whereas in the placebotraining condition, neither word type (neutral or positive) predicted the probe location. Thus, the training paradigm implicitly trained participants to shift their attention toward positive information.
Following training, participants completed a decision-making task similar to that used in Beevers et al. (2013) . One concern about the decision-making task used in Beevers et al. was that the reward values for each option were too dramatically different, making the task too easy, and subsequently diminishing performance differences between individuals with elevated depressive symptoms and nondepressives. Thus, in the present study we increased the variability of each option. This increased variability in the reward structure made the task more challenging by requiring participants to learn the value of each option by taking rewards over several trials into consideration, as opposed to responding only to the most recently received reward. This is important because previous research has suggested that depressed individuals are impaired at integrating reward history over time (Pizzagalli et al., 2008) . Supporting this idea, our prior work (Beevers et al., 2013) showed that individuals with elevated depressive symptoms were more likely to alter their expected values for each option on the basis of recently received rewards, whereas nondepressed control participants relied on a longer sequence of previous rewards in determining expected reward value.
Taken together, we made the following predictions. First, we predicted that individuals with elevated depressive symptoms who received placebo attention training would show a decision-making performance deficit relative to nondepressive controls. Second, we predicted that individuals with elevated depressive symptoms who received active attention training toward positive stimuli would show enhanced performance relative to those in the placebotraining condition, and performance comparable to that of the nondepressive controls.
Method

Participants
The participants were 92 newly recruited undergraduate students who completed the study as part of a research requirement for an introduction to psychology course. Participants completed the short form of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-SF; Beck & Steer, 1993 ) during a pretesting survey battery. Participants whose scores were above 7 on the BDI-SF were contacted about participating in the depressive groups, whereas participants whose scores were below 7 on the short form were contacted about participating in the nondepressive control group.
Procedure
At the beginning of the experimental session, all participants completed a demographic form and a series of computerbased questionnaires that included the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977) . The CES-D scores were used to verify that participants were still experiencing depressive symptoms at the time of testing and to validate previously recorded BDI scores. Participants with elevated levels of self-reported depressive symptoms were randomly assigned to the active-training or placebo-training groups. They were not told that depression was a measure of interest and were not told anything about their group membership. Research assistants were also blind to participant assignments to the placebo-or active-training conditions. It is also important to note that the term "training" was not mentioned to the participants: They were not given any information that they might be undergoing attention training until they were debriefed at the end of the experiment. This ensured that the participants were unaware of the study's purpose as well as their experimental condition.
For the placebo-training and active-training groups, participants completed three blocks (all in the same session) of the attention-training task for approximately 15 min each. Each block consisted of 168 trials, for a total of 504. Before and after the three-block training session, participants completed a two-item questionnaire about their current mood. They were given 2 min between each block to relax before starting the next block. Immediately following training, participants completed the decision-making task. The low-depressive-symptom control group did not undergo training and completed the decision-making task immediately following completion of demographic information and questionnaires.
Depression classification
Following convention (Weissman & Sholomskas, 1977) , participants who scored 15 or less on the CES-D were classified as having low depressive symptoms, and those who obtained a score of 16 or greater were classified as having elevated depressive symptoms. CES-D scores of 16 or greater reflect moderate or greater symptoms of depression (Radloff, 1977) . A cut point of 16 on the CES-D has very good sensitivity and specificity for the prediction of current major depressive disorder (Beekman et al., 1997) . Participants were only included in the analysis if their CES-D score (16 or higher for the elevated depressive symptom groups and 15 or lower for the nondepressive group) was consistent with their classification from the previously recorded BDI-SF score, resulting in 75 participants: n = 20 elevated depressive symptom participants in the active-attention-training group, n = 22 elevated depressive symptom participants in the placebo-training group, and n = 33 in the nondepressive control group.
Attention training
This task was designed to train participants' attention toward positive information (i.e., words) using a modified dot-probe paradigm. The task used neutral and positive valence words from the Affective Norms for English Words list (ANEW; M. M. Bradley & Lang, 1999) . Words were matched for letter length and frequency use in the English language. Therefore, the only differences between the lists of positive and neutral words were valence and arousal. The attention-training task is displayed in Fig. 1a . Each trial of the task began with a 500-ms presentation of a fixation cross. Following the cross, a pair of stimuli, a positive word and a neutral word, were randomly presented to the right and the left side of the computer screen for 1,000 ms. The words then disappeared and a dot probe (i.e., * or **) appeared behind one of the previously displayed words. This probe appeared on the screen until the participant pressed one of two response buttons to indicate the identity of the probe (one or two asterisks). In the active-training condition, the probe was presented in the location associated with the positive word on 85 % of the trials and the neutral word on 15 % of the trials. In the placebo-training condition, the probe was presented in the location of the neutral word on 50 % of the trials and in the location of the positive word on the other 50 %. In both conditions, the positive word appeared randomly and equally on either side of the screen.
We selected a stimulus duration of 1,000 ms on the basis of previous research (B. P. Bradley, Mogg, & Lee, 1997 ) that had shown that levels of depressive symptoms on the BDI were strongly correlated with attentional bias score for valenced words presented for 1,000 ms. Consistent with previous research (T. T. Wells & Beevers, 2010) , we used 85 % positive rather than 100 % in the training condition in order to keep the intent of the study from being transparent.
Decision-making task
The decision-making task was performed on PC computers using MATLAB software with Psychtoolbox 2.54 (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) . Participants were given a hypothetical scenario that they would be testing two oxygen extraction systems on Mars, with the goal of collecting enough oxygen to sustain life. Participants were told that on each trial they would select one of the two systems. After each selection a bar, representing a small oxygen tank, would show the amount of Fig. 1 a Sample screen shot from the training task. In the placebotraining condition, the positive and neutral words each preceded the dot probe with equal probability. In the active-training condition, the positive word preceded the dot probe on 85 % of the trials. b Sample screen shot from the decision-making task. The participants were told that they were testing two oxygen extraction systems. The oxygen extracted on each trial was shown in the "current" tank and then transferred to the "cumulative" tank before the next trial began oxygen that they had just extracted. The oxygen would then be moved into the larger tank, and the next trial would begin. A line on the larger tank corresponded to the amount of oxygen needed to sustain life on Mars. Participants were given the goal of trying to collect this amount of oxygen over the course of the experiment. Figure 1b shows a sample screen shot from the decision-making experiment. The goal line was set at the equivalent of selecting the optimal option on approximately 80 % of trials. Participants performed a total of 150 trials and were told nothing about the nature of the reward structure.
The reward structure for the decision-making task is shown in Fig. 2 . In this two-option task, the average reward for the suboptimal option was 55 points (units of oxygen), whereas the average reward for the optimal option was 65 points. However, because the standard deviation around the mean reward for each option was 15 units, the optimal option did not yield a larger reward on every trial.
Results
The mean CES-D scores for the elevated depressive symptom active-training and placebo-training groups were 35.20 and 33.23, respectively. These did not differ significantly, t(40) = 0.800, p = .429, Cohen's d = 0.252. The mean CES-D score for the nondepressive control group was 7.70, which was significantly lower than those in both the active-training and placebo-training groups (ps < .001).
Performance in the decision-making task was measured by analyzing the proportion of trials on which participants selected the optimal choice (the higher average reward) throughout the experiment. We used one-sample t tests to determine whether performance significantly exceeded chance. Performance exceeded chance in the activeattention-training group (M = .69), t(19) = 6.527, p < .001, the placebo-training group (M = .61), t(21) = 3.118, p = .005, and the nondepressive control group (M = .72), t(32) = 7.595, p < .001. Thus, all groups learned to select the optimal choice. We next used an analysis of variance (ANOVA) to examine the effect of group (placebo training, active training, nondepressive control) on the proportions of optimal selections (Fig. 3a) . We observed an overall effect of group, F(2, 72) = 3.786, p = .027, η p 2 = .095, as well as a significant linear contrast, F(1, 72) = 7.472, p = .008, η p 2 = .094. As predicted, the participants who received placebo training selected the optimal choice less often than those in the nondepressive control group, t(53) = −2.573, p = .013, Cohen's d = 0.707. Also as predicted, the participants who received placebo training selected the optimal choice less often than those in the active-attention-training group, t(40) = −1.828, p = .06, Cohen's d = 0.578. No statistically significant difference in performance emerged across the attention-trained participants with elevated depressive symptoms and the nondepressive control group, t(51) = −0.786, p = .436, Cohen's d = 0.220. A post hoc power analysis revealed that, on the basis of the between-groups comparison effect size observed in the present study (d = 0.220), an N of approximately 648 would be needed to obtain statistical power at the recommended .80 level (Cohen, 1988) between the active-attention-training and nondepressive groups. Optimal performance in this task relied on exploitation of the choice option that awarded the highest average reward. We hypothesized that the observed performance deficit in depressives may have been attributable to suboptimal Fig. 2 Decision-making task reward structure. Depending on their selection, participants received the reward corresponding to Option A or Option B. Option A gave a mean reward of 55 points, whereas option B gave a mean reward of 65 points switching between options on the basis of fluctuations in the reward environment. To explore this possibility, we examined the number of trials in which participants switched between reward options within each of the three participant groups (Fig. 4a ). Using an ANOVA, we found a significant effect of group membership on the numbers of switch trials F(2, 72) = 3.181, p = .047, η p 2 = .081. The placebo-training group (M = 48.45) switched between options significantly more often than the nondepressive control group (M = 33.00), t(53) = 2.515, p = .015, Cohen's d = 0.690. The active-attentiontraining group (M = 39.15) was intermediate between the placebo-trained and nondepressive groups. Consistent with these findings, a significant linear contrast emerged for depression group, F (1, 72) = 6.362, p = .014, η p 2 = .081, suggesting that switching decreased monotonically across the placebo-training, active-training, and nondepressive control groups. Across all participants, the numbers of switches were negatively correlated with performance on the task, r(74) = −.453, p < .001.
We also examined "delta reward values" on trials that preceded switch trials. To calculate a delta reward value for each trial, we compared the reward received on that trial with the most recently received reward for the selected option. Negative values indicated smaller rewards relative to the reward received the last time that option had been chosen, whereas positive values indicated greater rewards relative to the last reward received for that option. On average, the placebotraining group switched to the other option after a delta reward of −3.65 points, whereas the nondepressive control and active-training groups switched after an average delta reward value of −4.48 and −5.89 points, respectively. Thus, although these differences were not statistically significant (p s > .1), participants in the placebo-trained group had a numerically smaller threshold for switching following declines in reward, relative to what they had previously received when they had selected the same option.
The subjective measures of mood, collected before and after the training procedure, were also analyzed. Participants rated their current mood on two 9-point scales, from not happy at all to very happy, and from not sad at all to very sad. The pre and post mood scores were compared for both the placebo-training and activeattention-training groups by using paired t tests. The pre and post mood scores were not significantly different for Fig. 4 a Average numbers of times that the participants in each group switched between reward options across 150 trials. Error bars represent standard errors of the means. b Average numbers of switches between reward options, based on 1,000 simulations for each group using the extended RL model. Error bars represent standard errors of the means either question for either group (ps > .1), indicating that changes in decision-making performance were not attributable to conscious changes in mood.
We also examined the correlations between CES-D scores and the proportions of optimal selections in the decision-making task. Across participants who did not receive active attention training (nondepressive controls and placebo training with elevated depressive symptoms), CES-D scores were negatively correlated with the proportion of optimal selections, r(53) = −.296, p = .03. Interestingly, this trend was present in the nondepressive control group alone, r(31) = −.339, p = .05, indicating that depressive symptoms may be negatively related to decision-making performance even at levels below the standard CES-D cutoff for depression. The correlations within both the depressive active-training and placebotraining groups were not significant (ps > .1).
Computational modeling
The behavioral results suggest that attention training attenuates the decision-making deficits observed in individuals with elevated self-reported depressive symptoms. To better understand the strategies that participants used to make decisions in the task, we fitted a series of computational models, including a baseline model, a basic reinforcement learning (RL) model with a Softmax decision rule (Beevers et al., 2013; Frank & Kong, 2008; Lee, Zhang, Munro, & Steyvers, 2011; Steyvers, Lee, & Wagenmakers, 2009; Sutton & Barto, 1998; Worthy & Maddox, 2011) , and a novel extension of the RL model that accounts separately for positive and negative prediction errors.
The basic Softmax RL model accounts for decisionmaking behavior by updating expected reward values (EVs) for each option, i , on each trial, t , as in Eq. 1. EV s are initialized at zero for each option and are updated on the basis of the prediction error δ:
Here, r(t) is the reward received for the chosen option. Prediction errors are used to update EV s each time that an option is chosen, on the basis of the following update rule:
The recency parameter (α), 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, weighs the degree to which participants update the expected values for each option on the basis of their most recently received rewards. As α approaches 1, recent rewards are given greater weight in updating EVs. An α of 0 indicates that no learning took place and that EV s were not updated from their initial starting point. The expected values for each option are used to determine the probabilities for selecting each option by the Softmax decision rule (Sutton & Barto, 1998) :
where θ is an exploitation parameter of the degree to which the option with the highest EV is chosen. Higher values of θ indicate that the highest-valued option is chosen more often, and a value of zero indicates that the options are chosen equally often. Depressives show enhanced punishment processing but deficient reward processing (i.e., Eshel & Roiser, 2010) . Punishments are directly associated with negative prediction errors, and rewards with positive prediction errors. To explore positive and negative reward prediction errors mechanistically, we extended the model to account separately for positive and negative prediction errors. We let the model freely estimate two learning rate parameters that were used to update the EVs in Eq. 2 when prediction errors were positive (α pos ) or negative (α neg ). This rule allowed the model to track the recencyweighted average rewards provided by each option.
A critical aspect of this standard RL model is that it assumes that on any given trial, the EVs for each option are represented by a single numerical value. An alternative assumption is that EV s are represented in the form of distributions around a mean value, rather than an exact single value. This assumption has been highlighted in recent RL and associative-learning work (Doll, Jacobs, Sanfey, & Frank, 2009; Frank, Doll, Oas-Terpstra, & Moreno, 2009; Kruschke, 2008) and is likely more realistic in environments with variable rewards provided on each trial.
The variance, or the noise around the mean of each distribution of expected values, could indicate the level of uncertainty that people have as to what reward they will actually receive. Here we developed a model that assumes that the mean EV for the distribution of EV s is a recencyweighted average of past rewards for each option, as updated in Eq. 2, and that the noise (N ) around each mean is a recencyweighted average of the squared prediction errors on each trial:
The degree to which the noise estimates are updated on the basis of the most recent prediction errors is modulated by a recency parameter (α N ), 0 ≤ α N ≤ 1, similar to how EV s are updated in Eq. 2 above. Here, we also fitted the model with separate α N parameters for trials with positive, α N(pos) , and negative, α N(neg) , prediction errors. This approach is similar to recent approaches that have approximated noise, or the variance in the most likely outcome for each choice option, by tracking the variance in recent outcomes Nassar, Wilson, Heasly, & Gold, 2010) .
The initial N estimate for each option (N 0 ) is a free parameter in the model that represents the initial uncertainty that participants have regarding the average reward provided by each option. The extended RL model includes this noise term in the Softmax rule to account for behavior in which participants select options that they have greater or lesser uncertainty about:
As in the basic RL model, we set a minimum value of 0 on θ , but we allowed θ N to be positive or negative. Positive values indicate a preference for options that have greater uncertainty, whereas negative values indicate a preference for options with lesser uncertainty. Thus, the addition of the noise term allows us to account for behavior in which participants attempt to reduce uncertainty regarding the noise around each expected reward value.
In sum the extended RL model has seven free parameters: α pos , α neg , α N(pos) , α N(neg) , N 0 , θ , and θ N , whereas the basic RL model has two free parameters: α and θ . We compared the relative fits of these models using the Akaike information criterion (AIC) for each model, which rewards goodness of fit but also includes a penalty for increasing the number of free parameters (Akaike, 1974) . This was done to ensure that the increase in the relative fit of the model was not outweighed by the flexibility of additional parameters.
The final model that we fitted, a baseline (or null) model, assumes fixed choice probabilities (Gureckis & Love, 2009; Worthy & Maddox, 2011; Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2005 ). The baseline model has one free parameter, which represents the probability of selecting one of the two options on any given trial. This model does not assume that participants learn from rewards given on each trial, yet it provides a good fit for data when participants repeatedly choose the same option (Gureckis & Love, 2009 ).
Model-based predictions
Our models could capture the performance differences between groups in two clear ways. One possibility was that all groups would be fit best by the basic Softmax RL model, but with different parameter estimates indicating that learning was occurring at different rates. Specifically, we would expect to see higher variability in action choices in the placebotrained group, represented by a lower exploitation parameter estimate, consistent with Beevers et al. (2013) and Kunisato et al. (2012) .
A second possibility, which we believed to be the most likely, was that the observed behavioral differences could be attributed to increased attention to negative information in the placebo-trained group with elevated depressive symptoms, and that increased attention to negative information would result in increased learning when prediction errors were negative, ultimately causing overadjustment of the expected value for that option and suboptimal switching. In the extended RL model, negative and positive reward prediction errors update the expected values for each option with separate learning rates (recency parameters), allowing the model to account for differential learning from positive and negative prediction errors. Consistent with depressives' hypersensitivity to negative feedback and punishment (i.e., Eshel & Roiser, 2010) , we would expect depressives' increased attention to negative information to result in increased learning rates for negative prediction errors. Since attention training is thought to reduce this bias, we would expect to see reduced learning rates (lower recency parameter) for negative prediction errors in the active-attention-training group relative to the placebo-training group.
Modeling results
We fit each participant's data individually with the models detailed above. The models were fit on a trialby-trial basis to the participant's response and the parameters were estimated by maximizing likelihood. We used Akaike weights (Wagenmakers & Farrell, 2004) to compare the relative fits of the models. The Akaike weights are derived from the AIC (Akaike, 1974) , which is defined for each model i as
where L i is the maximum likelihood for model i and V i is the number of free parameters in the model. Notice that the AIC measure penalizes the model for each additional free parameter.
The AIC values were used to generate the Akaike weight for each of the three models for each participant. The relative likelihood, L , of each model, i , is computed using the transform
where Δ i (AIC) represents the difference between the AIC for that model and the lowest AIC of all candidate models. The relative likelihoods of each candidate model are then normalized by dividing each of the likelihoods by the sum of all likelihoods for all k models:
These Akaike weights can be interpreted as the probability that the model is the best model for the data, given the data sets from the set of candidate models (Wagenmakers & Farrell, 2004) .
We computed Akaike weights for each model for each participant. Figure 5 shows the average Akaike weights for each condition. The extended RL model was clearly the bestfitting model for all groups.
Extended RL model results
We used simulations to verify that the extended RL model provided a good account for the observed data. For each group, 1,000 simulations were conducted by sampling (with replacement) a set of parameters from one participant in that group for each simulation.
The results of the simulation data were strikingly similar to the behavioral data (see Fig. 3b ), indicating that the model provides a good account of the behavioral data. We also examined the frequency of switch trials from the simulation data, which were again similar to the switch trials observed in the behavioral data (Fig. 4b ). This suggests that the model parameters are related to the behavior observed in this study.
We examined the parameters of interest: the learning rates for negative and positive reward prediction errors (Fig. 6 ). We observed no main effect of group for learning rates in positive prediction errors (p > .1); however, we observed a marginally significant main effect of group in learning from negative prediction errors, F(2, 72) = 2.910, p = .061, and a significant linear contrast, F(1, 72) = 5.755, p = .019, η p 2 = .074. In decomposing this effect, we found that placebo-trained group with elevated depressive symptoms had significantly higher learning rates from negative prediction errors than did nondepressives, t(53) = 2.441, p = .018, Cohen's d = 0.670; the same learning rate parameter for the active-attentiontrained group was intermediate between those of the other two groups.
We then compared the estimated parameter values for learning from negative prediction errors and positive prediction errors within each of the three groups. For the placebo-training group, the learning rate (recency parameter α) for negative prediction errors was marginally higher than the learning rate for positive prediction errors, t(42) = 1.887, p = .066, Cohen's d = 0.582. The negative and positive learning rates were not different between the other two groups, ps > .1, indicating that of the three groups, only the placebo-training group may have learned more from negative than from positive prediction errors.
In addition to providing a good fit for the behavioral data, the simulations using the extended RL model accounted for the differences in the numbers of trials on which participants switched between options that we had observed across the three groups. In summary, participants in the placebo-training group learned more from negative prediction errors and switched to the suboptimal choice following negative reward prediction errors more often than nondepressives did. The group with elevated depressive symptoms that received active training and the nondepressive group did not show a difference between learning from negative and positive reward prediction errors, they switched less between options, and thus they performed better on the task.
Discussion
Individuals with major depression and elevated depressive symptoms face physical, social, and cognitive challenges. The presence of depressive symptoms is associated with increased attention to negative information and decreased attention to positive information. This reward-processing deficit has broad effects on cognition, including one's ability to make good decisions (Beevers et al., 2013; Kunisato et al., 2012; Maddox et al., 2012; Pizzagalli et al., 2008) . Recent research has suggested that these reward-processing deficits may be malleable and can be attenuated with attention training (T. T. Wells & Beevers, 2010) .
The overriding aim of the present study was to determine whether an attention-training procedure that was successful in ameliorating depressive symptoms might be used to attenuate the prevalent deficit in decision making. In line with previous research (Beevers et al., 2013; Kunisato et al., 2012; Maddox et al., 2012) , we found that individuals with elevated depressive symptoms performed worse than nondepressives in maximizing rewards. Importantly, this performance deficit was significantly attenuated when participants were given attention training toward positive stimuli prior to performing the decisionmaking task. In fact, the performance of the active-attentiontrained group was no different from that of nondepressives.
Computational modeling was utilized to better understand the strategies being used by each group to solve the decisionmaking task. Analysis of the best-fitting model parameters suggests that of the three groups, the placebo-trained group had the highest learning rate for negative prediction errors and the greatest discrepancy in learning from negative prediction errors relative to positive prediction errors.
These findings indicate that individuals with elevated depressive symptoms place too much weight on immediate rewards, particularly when these rewards are less than expected, resulting in overcorrection of their expected value for the reward option. This is consistent with previous research demonstrating that people with elevated depressive symptoms were more likely to alter their expected values on the basis of recently received rewards (Beevers et al., 2013) . In our study, this overcorrection in response to negative prediction errors resulted in an increased frequency of suboptimal switching relative to nondepressives.
Training attention toward positive information decreased learning from negative prediction errors and decreased the frequency of switching to the suboptimal choice, improving task performance. Importantly, performance of the activetrained group was not different from that of the nondepressive group. This is an exciting finding, since it suggests that attention training can reduce depressives' bias toward negative information, which often leads to poor decision making. Individuals with elevated depressive symptoms who experienced training had numerically lower frequencies of switching and learning rates for negative prediction errors than did those who did not receive training. Future work will explore the effect of longer-term training to see whether repeated training further improves decision making and persists over time.
It should be noted that the performance difference between depressives and nondepressives in this task was much greater than the performance difference observed in Beevers et al. (2013) . This may be attributable to the different reward structures underlying the previously published study and the present one, although a direct empirical comparison would be required to draw any strong conclusions. The task in the previous article had a clear separation between the optimal and suboptimal choices, in which the lowest reward for the "good" option was still higher than the highest reward from the "bad" option. Thus, because the rewards never overlapped, the task was relatively easy, and few performance or strategy differences were observed between the groups. These findings are consistent with the idea that depression has less of an effect on easier, automatic processing, but has a greater effect on more demanding tasks (Hartlage, Alloy, Vázquez, & Dykman, 1993; Hertel, 1994) .
Limitations and future directions
One implication of this work is that depressive individuals do have the cognitive-processing capabilities to perform well in a gain-maximizing task, and that this ability can be enhanced with training. Attention training during a single session reduced the reward-learning deficit, likely by reducing learning from negative (punishment-based) prediction errors. Future work would benefit from utilization of punishment-based tasks to determine whether attention training increases reward learning or decreases punishment-based learning. Future work should also evaluate the effect of attention training on performance in history-dependent tasks for which reduced sensitivity to negative reward prediction errors may not be beneficial.
Although it is possible that attention training may improve performance on these tasks, it is also possible that attention training enhances the use of implicit, reflexive strategies that may not benefit all types of reward-maximization tasks.
Since similar training has also been shown to reduce reported depressive symptoms when it is completed four times over the course of two weeks (T. T. Wells & Beevers, 2010) , future work should also evaluate the effect of longer-term training on protracted cognitive abilities and the experience of depression symptoms. Decision-making deficits were attenuated with short-term training in this study but did not change mood. Since the long-term training has been shown to reduce depressive symptoms, altering mood, there is reason to think that decision-making performance could be further improved.
Long-term training efforts should seek to evaluate changes in reward sensitivity, depression, and cognitive abilities.
In the present work, the nondepressive group demonstrated a numerically greater but nonsignificant bias for learning due to negative over positive prediction errors. Thus, it is unclear how this training paradigm would affect those with normative emotional processing. It is worth noting that task performance varied within the nondepressive group. On average, performance was better for the nondepressive than for the placebo-trained depressive group. However, some nondepressive individuals exhibited difficulty with reward maximization and could have benefited from attention training toward positive stimuli. It is therefore possible that attention training might also be helpful for decision making in healthy individuals with relatively low reward processing. It is also possible that nondepressives would develop a strong bias for learning from positive prediction errors that could impair task performance. Future work should apply these training paradigms to nondepressive individuals to determine the impact of attention training on subsequent learning in healthy adults.
Several limitations of the present study should be noted. First, we did not complete diagnostic interviews, and thus did not have extensive information regarding past psychopathology, use of psychoactive substances or medications, or neurological diseases. Although all participants in the groups with elevated depressive symptoms exceeded a cut point on the CES-D commonly used to screen for major depressive disorder (Radloff, 1977) , it is likely that some participants would not have met the criteria for a major depressive episode. Thus, it is unknown whether clinically depressed individuals would perform similarly in the decision-making task used in this study, and whether they would be affected by attention training in the same way. We also do not know whether the findings of this study would generalize to other decision-making tasks, including those for which actual monetary gains and losses are utilized. Future studies using clinically diagnosed patients and multiple decision-making tasks should be used to answer these questions.
Another limitation of the present study is that independent measures of attention were not collected before and after training. Obtaining an independent measure of attention both before and after training (ideally with new stimuli) could provide additional evidence that the changes in decisionmaking performance observed in the present study were due to changes in attention rather than to another underlying factor (for an example, see Amir et al., 2009 ). Finally, although our findings are consistent with previous work that identified decision-making deficits in individuals with elevated levels of depressive symptoms (Beevers et al., 2013; Kunisato et al., 2012; Maddox et al., 2012; Pizzagalli et al., 2008) , it is important to note that replication is a critical pillar of the scientific method. Given our small sample size, replication of these findings in future studies will be critical to increasing our confidence in the robustness of our experimental effects.
Conclusions
This work has provided important new insights into the effects of attention training on decision-making performance in individuals with elevated depressive symptoms. Attention training can be used to attenuate depressives' deficits in gain maximization to a point at which performance does not differ relative to that of nondepressives. Computational modeling suggests that training attention toward positive stimuli enhances performance by reducing a bias for learning from negative prediction errors, resulting in decreased suboptimal switching and increased performance. Thus, training toward positive stimuli can be used to improve decision making in individuals experiencing elevated levels of depressive symptoms.
